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NonConceptual Content and Objectivity
D. Hutto
Aristotle once developed the difference between man 
and animal in the following way: animals can 
understand each other by indicating to each other what 
excites their desire so they can seek it, and what injures 
them, so they can flee from it. To men alone is logos 
given as well, so that they can make manifest to each 
other what is useful and harmful, and therefore what is 
right and wrong. A profound thesis.
-- Gadamer, "Man and Language" 
1. Introduction
[1] In recent times the question of whether or not there is such a thing as 
nonconceptual content has been the object of much serious attention. For 
analytical philosophers, the locus classicus of the view that there is such a 
phenomena is to be found in Evans remarks about perceptual experience in 
Varieties of Reference. He famously wrote: 
In general, we may regard a perceptual experience as an 
informational state of the subject: it has a certain content -- the world 
is represented a certain way -- and hence it permits of a non-
derivative classification as true or false. For an internal state to be so 
regarded, it must have appropriate connections with behaviour -- it 
must have a certain motive force upon the actions of the subject.... 
The informational states which a subject acquires through perception 
are non-conceptual, or nonconceptualised. Judgements based upon 
such states necessarily involve conceptualisation. (Evans 1982: 226-
227). 
[2] John McDowell has taken issue with Evans precisely over his claim that 
"conceptual capacities are first brought into operation only when one makes a 
judgement of experience, and at that point a different species of content comes 
into play" (McDowell 1994: 48). In contrast, he proposes that "A judgement of 
experience does not introduce a new kind of content, but simply endorses the 
conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed by the experience on 
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which it is grounded" (McDowell 1994: 48-49). Ironically, in light of the ambitions 
of Mind and World, this sits very happily with the firmly embedded views of many 
traditional classical cognitivists. It has been a long-standing article of faith that, 
even in its most basic forms, perceptual content must be conceptual. But those 
who adopt this position have a heavy burden when it comes to explaining the 
origin and development of concepts (cf. Peacocke 1992a: 9). 
[3] Standardly, in line with the proposal that at least some primitive concepts must 
be innate, theorists like Fodor make appeal to the intrinsic character of such 
concepts to explain more complex conceptual contents and their essential 
characteristics (Fodor 1998: 130). But, of course, what is never explained is the 
origin of the primitive concepts themselves other than by tongue in cheek remarks 
about what God would have bestowed us with (cf. Fodor 1998: 129).1 Primitive 
concepts and their properties as simply assumed because of an explanatory need 
despite that fact that making this assumption has a paradoxical consequence -- 
which, in this case, is revealed by Fodor's claim that all concepts must be 
acquired inductively (cf. Fodor 1998: 130-132). It is ironic then that Fodor rebukes 
Dennett for suggesting that "it's learning a language that makes a mind 
systematic" (Fodor 1998: 26). He accuses those who attempt such explanations 
of sweeping "the problem from under the hall rug to under the rug in the 
parlour" (Fodor 1998: 26). But if anything is sweeping a problem under a rug, it is 
the unexplained postulation of conceptual contents all the way down to the bottom 
rungs of experience. 
[4] The good news is that if we opt for a nonconceptualist approach then no 
concepts need be innate, nor do I think any are. There is a plausible programme 
afoot, initiated by Cussins, which hopes explain "the construction of cognitive 
properties out of non-cognitive properties" (Cussins 1990: 374). For example, he 
encourages us to suppose "that the mind/world distinction is a phylogenetic or 
ontogenetic achievement" (Cussins 1990: 409). However, some advocates of 
nonconceptual content believe that providing this explanation will be a relatively 
straightforward, although clearly difficult, task given that a contentful base of 
nonconceptual informational states, of the kind Evans envisioned, is 
presupposed. While it is my concern to defend Evans' distinction between the 
conceptual and the nonconceptual, and indeed to draw the dividing line precisely 
where he draws it -- at the point where judgements come into play -- I am alive to 
a serious charge that McDowell raises against him. In a bid to establish that the 
relation between our capacities for receptivity and spontaneity are harmonious 
while averting endorsement of the Myth of the Given, McDowell claims that, 
although it is not immediately obvious, Evans' account is itself "a version of the 
Myth of the Given" (McDowell 1994: 51). It is not obvious because Evans clearly 
cuts the cords with judgement-making when he advocates a nonconceptual 
account of experience. Nevertheless, it is his traditional understanding of content 
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that betrays him. In McDowell's words: "the word 'content' plays just the role in 
Evans' account that is played in that position by the fraudulent word 
'conceptual'..." (McDowell 1994: 53).
[5] This objection sticks. Moreover, if nonconceptual content is to play the 
important role of helping to explain the development of concepts then we must 
explicate the nature of such content in such a way that does not presuppose that 
it is truth-conditional. We must also be able to say exactly what part 
nonconceptual responses play in judgement making and conceptual 
development.2 It will be the burden of this paper to provide a sketch of how both 
these ends might be achieved and to offer some reasons for thinking the project 
is a viable one. I do this in two stages. The first is to advocate a modest 
biosemantic theory of nonconceptual content and the second is to show how this 
can shore up a Davidsonian understanding of the possession conditions for 
concepts (Peacocke 1992a: 5).
2. Nonconceptual content sans truth conditions
[6] The nature of the content that putatively applies to nonconceptual responses 
stands in need of clarification. This is clear if we consider the suggestion that it 
might play a role in the explanation of the development of full blown concepts as 
Cussins does when he claims that non-conceptual content can provide the means 
for understanding the emergence of the "objective" from the "non-objective". 
There has been some confusion in the literature on what this requires. For 
example, Bermúdez has recently claimed that Peacocke's rejection of the 
"Autonomy Thesis" makes the latter's account of non-conceptual content useless 
in providing a phylogenetic theory of conceptual development. The "Autonomy 
Thesis" states that "it is possible for a creature to be in states with nonconceptual 
content, even though that creature possesses no concepts at all" (Bermúdez 
1994: 405). Thus, Bermúdez writes if such a thesis "is rejected, then it will be ipso 
facto impossible to give at least one type of developmental explanation of 
conceptual content in terms of nonconceptual content -- namely, the type of 
developmental explanation that involves explaining how a creature in states with 
only nonconceptual content, such as for example a new-born human infant, can 
develop into a full-fledged concept user" (Bermúdez 1994: 405).
[7] In reply Peacocke makes it clear that Bermúdez's criticisms miss their mark. 
He concedes that there is potentially more than one form of non-conceptual 
content. In this regard, it important to note that what he calls "scenario content" -- 
which is equivalent to the notion of a spatial type (see also Peacocke 1992a: 64; 
Peacocke 1994: 420) -- is the "arguably the most fundamental type of 
representational content" (Peacocke 1992b: 105, emphasis mine). It is therefore 
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clearly consistent for him to endorse the claim that "scenario content" requires a 
rejection of the autonomy thesis without being committed to the view that all forms 
of non-conceptual content require a similar rejection of that thesis. In particular, 
he tells us that his views are compatible with acceptance of Cussin's construction-
theoretic account of non-conceptual content. He writes: 
Since CT [construction-theoretic] content is distinct from scenario 
content, and my rejection of the Autonomy Thesis is a rejection of a 
thesis about scenario content, that rejection poses no obstacle to 
those who see either a developmental or a phylogenetic progression 
from states with only CT content to states with conceptual content.
(Peacocke 1994: 424)3 
[8] This is an interesting response because in allowing for the possibility of what 
Peacocke calls CT content he is allowing for a kind of non-conceptual content that 
is both "pre-objective" and which "lacks correctness conditions" (see Peacocke 
1994: 423, 424). But I want to argue that although the most basic form of 
nonconceptual content is "pre-objective" it nevertheless must have correctness 
conditions on the pain of not being content at all. It is important to keep these 
notions distinct.
[9] It follows logically that in order to serve the role of explaining the development 
of concepts the most basic form of non-conceptual content must be being pre-
objective in character. Cussins and Chrisley have laid the ground for 
understanding this aspect of non-conceptual content by excavating the work of 
Evans and Strawson (Cussins 1990; Chrisley 1993; Evans 1982; Strawson 1959). 
They remind us of the important distinction between objective and pre-objective 
modes of thought. Chrisley writes: 
truly objective thought is manifested in the possession and 
maintenance of a unified conceptual framework within which the 
subject can locate, and thus relate to any other arbitrary object of 
thought, the bit of the world thought about....
Pre-objective representation involves contents that present the 
world, but not as the world, not as something that is or can be 
independent of the subject. (Chrisley 1993: 331) 
[10] Chrisley provides an illustration of pre-objective thought with reference to the 
responses of infants before they have attained the stage of recognising object 
permanence (Chrisley 1993: 331). He suggests infants lack the ability to think of 
objects as existing unperceived and hence, they clearly lack a conceptual 
capacity to represent "objects" qua objects in our sense. For this reason both he 
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and Cussins see this mode of non-objective responding as a violation of the 
"generality constraint" (see Cussins 1993: 661-663). Evans describes the 
constraint in the following terms: "if a subject can be credited with the thought a is 
F then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a 
is G, for every property of G of which he has a conception. This condition I call the 
generality constraint" (Evans 1982: 104; see also Strawson 1959: ch. 3). Thus, 
with reference to Chrisley's example: 
an infant which cannot...think of a particular object (a glass, say) as 
existing unseen, but it can represent its mother as being behind, out 
of view (on the basis of hearing her voice or feeling her arm, say). 
The contents of such an infant will violate the Generality Constraint, 
since the infant may be able to think (something like) glass in front of 
me and mother behind me but not glass behind me. (Chrisley 1993: 
332) 
[11] If this is correct, then a crucial feature of non-objective modes of thought is 
that they lack the kind of systematicity which is a hallmark of logico-linguistic 
thought. Agents which only have a capacity for non-objective thought are simply 
not capable of making the kinds of systematic, formal substitutions which are 
bread and butter to conceptual thought. To accept this is to accept that it has 
been wrongly supposed by some that such substitutions, which are inherent in 
compositionality, inference making, and productivity, are also a "pervasive" 
criterion of cognition.4 The tradition would have it that if an organism can think of 
some object, x, that it has a property, Fx, then it must also have the ability to think 
of some other object (of similar type) such that it could have this property as well 
(e.g. Fy). The same applies to relational forms, such that if a subject can 
represent xRy, then it must also be capable of representing yRx. 
[12] The fact that basic non-conceptual content is not systematic is no bad thing. 
For states with non-conceptual content can still be behaviourally relevant even if 
pre-objective and non-systematic. Consider perceptual illusions such as that 
generated by the Müller-Lyer drawing. It can affect our perception by presenting 
things to us in a particular way which can be at variance to how we judge things 
to be. In the standard setting the difference is isolated to perceptual responses 
alone -- but it is not hard to imagine situations in which the illusion could affect 
actions as well. This is clear if we consider the plausible hypothesis that the 
Müller-Lyer illusion works on us because in a normal 3D setting the kind of 
perceptual responses it inspires are tied to our actions precisely because they 
help us in the detection of edges. The point to note is that while pre-objective 
nonconceptual content can influence an organism's response to the environment 
it does not do so by means of the manipulation of internal representations in the 
fashion that many philosophers (and classical cognitivists) have claimed. 
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Moreover, this is specifically because the kind of representations appropriate to 
such basic responses are not like those that the tradition has postulated. The 
most basic form of non-conceptual content does not map onto what we would 
recognise as "objective features" of the world. Thus, strictly speaking, although 
such contents may be crucially involved in guiding and controlling actions, it would 
be a mistake to think that they are systematically representative of the objects 
and features of an external reality as defined by our usual scheme of reference 
(see Cussins 1992b: 655-656).
[13] This brings us neatly back to Peacocke's second, more controversial point 
about "correctness conditions". If we say that a purely perceptual, but potentially 
action-guiding, response is non-conceptual we still want to regard it as having 
content. For even in the most basic cases of non-conceptual content it would 
appear that things, features and situations are presented to subjects as being in a 
certain way. It is for this reason that such content is regarded as 
"representational". For example, Bermúdez writes: 
Conceptual and nonconceptual content are distinguished not by 
whether they are representational, but according to how they 
represent (Bermúdez 1995: 335).5 
[14] But, it is also standardly supposed that to have any kind of "representational" 
content at all it is necessary that there are specifiable "correctness conditions". In 
Crane's words: 
To say that any state has content is just to say that it represents the 
world as being a certain way. It thus has what Peacocke...calls a 
"correctness condition" -- the condition under which it represents 
correctly (Crane 1992: 139, emphasis mine). 
[15] Hence if the advocates of nonconceptual content hope to explain the 
development of full blown concepts by appeal to such content, and they follow 
Peacocke's suggestion about CT-content, they will be caught on the horns of a 
dilemma. The first horn is that if nonconceptual content is to play this role, then it 
cannot lean on pregiven notions of "truth" and "reference" it order to clarify its 
notion of content (see Cussins, 1992b). The second horn, is that if we do not 
appeal to "truth" and "reference" in order to clarify non-conceptual content, then it 
is unclear that "correctness conditions" apply. But if we cannot speak of 
"correctness conditions" with respect to nonconceptual content then it is doubtful 
that we can consider it a form of "content" at all. 
[16] Recognising this Cussins has recently re-formulated his account of 
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nonconceptual content by appeal to the notion of the "realm of embodiment" 
which he contrasts with the "realm of reference". He objects to accounts which 
"suppose that representation in embodied practice is to be explained in terms of 
the prior, and therefore given, notions of truth and the realm of 
reference" (Cussins 1992b: 652, emphasis mine). His is an attempt to prioritise 
our experiential responding over our capacity to refer when theorising about our 
most basic cognitive performances (see Cussins 1992b: 653). His notion of 
nonconceptual content is meant to provide "a genuine notion of significant 
representation" which does not require taking "truth" or "reference" as basic 
notions. While I agree that this is needed I cannot see how an appeal to 
experience alone is sufficient to ground the kind of content needed to explain the 
emergence of an objective perspective on the world. 
[17] In contrast I propose that there is a form of "correctness condition" which 
does not equate to "truth conditions". Specifically, non-truth conditional 
correctness conditions can be explicated by a modest biosemantics.6 Moreover, I 
suggest that only in its modest form is biosemantics a plausible theory of content. 
Hence, in my view a modest version of biosemantics and nonconceptual content 
complement one another.
3. Biosemantic normativity
[18] There is nothing wrong in thinking that the most basic nonconceptual 
contents have "correctness conditions" provided we are careful in understanding 
their source and nature. In this section I will make a case for thinking that a 
properly modest biosemantics is not a truth-conditional account of representation, 
only an account of basic intentionality.7 A modest biosemantics accounts for the 
normativity which underwrites the intentional character of nonconceptual content 
without treating truth or reference as given. In order to make this case I review 
and defend some of the central features of biosemantic theory. Biosemantists 
claim that if we appeal to an organism's selectionist history in a principled fashion 
then it is possible to give a genuine naturalistic account of the nature of intentional 
phenomena.
[19] Millikan rightly insists that the first place it is appropriate to speak of "content", 
with respect to biological devices, is in relation to what she calls "intentional 
icons" (see Millikan 1984: ch. 6; 1993: ch. 5).8 As the name implies such icons 
are intentional (not intensional) in Brentano's sense in that they can be directed at 
features, objects or states of affairs which may or may not exist (see Millikan 
1993: 109; 1989: 96). Intentional icons have three essential features (adapted 
from Millikan 1993: 106-107).9 These are: 
file:///S|/LIS/LIS%20SHARED/UHRA/Preprints%20etc/Hutt...to,%20Nonconceptual%20content%20and%20objectivity.htm (7 of 39)21/08/2007 11:23:28
ejap 6:7: Hutto, Nonconceptual content and objectivity
(a) They are relationally adapted to some feature of the world.
(b) The relation described in (a) can be characterised by means of a 
mathematical conceived mapping rule.
(c) They have the direct proper function to guide a co-operating 
(consumer) device in the performance of its direct proper function(s). 
[20] Millikan's paradigm example of a simple intentional icon is the bee dance. 
Such dances are meant to generate an appropriate response in a co-operating 
consumer mechanism(s); the watching bee or bees. In this case, a patterned 
flight response which takes the bee(s) to the location of nectar.10 A bee dance, 
like other intentional icons, has both indicative and imperative aspects. If the 
relational conditions for this characteristic type of dance are normal then it will 
successfully map, via some mathematically describable projection rule. This is the 
icon's indicative aspect. If this is satisfied then it can direct the icon-consuming 
bees to the nectar's location. This is the icon's imperative aspect (see Millikan 
1984: 99). 
[21] The bee dance example also usefully illustrates the nature of derived, 
adapted proper functions. A token bee dance may be unique in the particular way 
it points a "consumer" bee(s) towards the location of nectar. It is therefore 
possible that a token dance could have a unique derived function to point thusly, 
in virtue of the fact that bee dances, as a class, have the stable direct proper 
function to send watching bees toward nectar (see Millikan 1984: 98; Jacob 1997: 
109). This is comparable to the way in which photocopier has both the general 
proper function to copy "that which is placed on the glass" and the supporting 
adapted, derived proper function to produce copies of the particular items placed 
on it.
[22] As is well known, there is a strong contrast between biosemantic accounts 
and causal/informational theories of content. This is because the former regard 
the proper functions of intentional icons as determined by a consideration of the 
dynamics of production and consumption devices, and with reference to their 
normal conditions for operation. Thus, Millikan stresses that: 
intentional icons do not, as such or in general, carry "natural 
information". Nor do they "covary" with or "track" what they icon. 
Their definition makes no reference to how likely or unlikely they are 
actually to correspond to their designated environmental features, 
nor how likely these features are to get mapped by them (Millikan 
1993: 107). 
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[23] It is important to realise that we cannot understand the direct proper function 
of intentional icons by sole reference to what they regularly map, statistically 
understood. For example, Millikan's work sharply distinguishes "proper" functions 
from mechano-functions. A device can have a proper function even if it rarely, or 
ever succeeds, in performing it. One of her favourite ways to illustrate this point is 
by appeal to the case of sperm and the ovum (see Millikan 1984: 4, 29, 34). She 
writes "It is the biological purpose of the sperm to swim until it reaches an ovum. 
That is what its tail is for. But very few sperm actually achieve this biological end 
because ova are in such short supply" (Millikan 1993: 223). As she never tires of 
observing, abnormality and dysfunction only make sense against a principled 
understanding of proper functioning. The point is that the proper function of a 
sperm cannot be understood by sole reference to its mechanical dispositions. For 
one thing there are too many things that, neutrally described, devices are 
disposed to do. In contrast, what we need is a normative standard in order to 
determine what the device is "supposed to" do. Similarly, the direct proper 
functions of icons need to be explicated with reference to what effect they ought 
to produce given the historical pedigree -- not their current dispositions (see 
Millikan 1993: 160; Millikan 1993: 25). In Millikan's own words, "some of us have 
argued [we should] ground the needed norms in evolutionary biology -- to let 
Darwinian natural processes set the standards against which failures, untruths, 
incorrectness, etc. are measured" (Millikan 1991: 151).
[24] For this reason the norms introduced by such an account must not be 
confused with statistical norms (Millikan 1993: 165). They appeal to a device's 
selectionist history in which success is measured, not by achieving a certain result 
x number of times above some arbitrary statistical threshold, but by a principled 
appeal to what was "good enough" for proliferation of the trait or response. The 
theory is fleshed out by appeal to the interlinked notions of "normal explanations" 
and "normal conditions". The former "explains the performance of a particular 
function, telling how it was (typically) historically performed on those (perhaps 
rare) occasions when it was properly performed" (Millikan 1993: 86). With respect 
to "normal conditions" her position is that they must "be mentioned when giving a 
full normal explanation for the performance of that function" (Millikan 1993: 86). 
To understand proper functions therefore requires reference to a device's "normal 
conditions" or "ideal conditions" of operation. The understanding these norms 
requires appeal to natural selection and there are good reasons to understand 
this in a decidedly etiological, or historically-based fashion. Thus Millikan says that 
"normal conditions" could also be described as "historically optimal 
conditions" (Millikan 1993: 87; see also 28).11
[25] It is in this way that appeals to a selectionist account of proper functions, 
which describes the effects a device is supposed to or meant to produce, 
provides the guide by which we are to assess whether or not any given 
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"intentional state" is mapped appropriately or inappropriately (see Rowlands 
1997: 283). Unlike other naturalistic theories of content the biosemantic theory 
does not depend on locating a special kind of "mapping relation" that exists 
between representation and that which is represented. It is achieved by coming to 
understand the dynamics and norms involved in icon consumption. We get the 
"mapping" relation gratis once this is done. It is, as it were, fallout.
4. Defending High Church Biosemantics
[26] Despite the obvious virtues of the biosemantic approach when it comes to 
solving a number of problems which plague other naturalistic theories of content, 
it has encountered the strong criticism that, appearances to the contrary, it does 
not provide a stable means of determining, and hence naturalising, content. Fodor 
has been the most vigilant opponent of this class of views and his remarks are the 
locus classicus of the critique. Referring to the time-worn example of the frog that 
can't distinguish between flies, black dots, and bee-bees, he writes: 
You can say why snapping is a good thing for frogs to do given their 
situation, whichever way you describe what they snap at. All that's 
required for frog snaps to be functional is that they normally succeed 
in getting flies into the frogs; and so long as the little black dots in the 
frog's Normal environment are flies, the snaps do this equally well on 
either account of their intentional objects (Fodor 1990b: 106). 
[27] It is important to be clear about this objection. It is well known that frogs tend 
to react to a whole range of small, dark, moving objects in the same manner (i.e. 
shooting out their tongues). We have already been told that appeal to device's 
proper function provides the logical space for a normative assessment of 
misrepresentation. But such assessment requires that we look to "the most 
proximate Normal explanation for full proper performance" (Millikan 1984: 100, 
emphasis original). Millikan's stipulation leads us to favour the view that the 
function of the tongue-snapping behaviour is not disjunctive at all; rather it is 
directed at flies and flies alone -- since ingesting these served the ancestors of 
this type of frog in the evolutionary history of these creatures. It alone enters into 
a full explanation of why the response mechanism proliferated (see Millikan 1993: 
213-214).12 But her version of biosemantics focuses on the fact that direct proper 
function of intentional icons must be defined in relation to the benefits which 
accrue to the consumer device(s) in the organism.13 Thus, the frog's tongue-
snapping behaviour is designed to get its dinner. Given this, its tongue-action 
should be directed at the range of edible objects which are compatible with the 
effective working of its stomach, in normal conditions of the kind which have 
benefited its ancestors.14
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[28] Bearing these points in mind, Fodor's critique has the following form: He 
agrees that from the selectionist perspective, a frog's inner icon only 
misrepresents in those cases where its snapping behaviour is not in line with the 
normal conditions that are part of an explanation of why the device was selected. 
But he suggests that if in the historical environment of the frogs' ancestors black 
dots of such and such a size, speed and shape were in fact coextensive with flies 
(or were often enough flies), then it doesn't matter which way we now choose to 
describe the frog's detection-device. In giving our explanation we can call it a fly 
or black-dot detector without consequence. All that matters is that a device with 
the propensity to detect small, dark moving things, in fact, aided this type of frog 
(or at least did not competitively disadvantage them) in the normal habitat of its 
ancestors and hence was "reproduced". His claim is that historical explanations of 
this kind do not provide a principled basis for making distinctions between 
intensionally alternative but explanatorily adequate descriptions (see Rowlands 
1997: 284; see also Godfrey-Smith 1994b: 273-274). As he says: "The context '--- 
happened' is transparent for the '---' position, so it would be sort of surprising if 
contexts defined in terms of it weren't transparent too" (Fodor 1991: 296).15 He 
claims it doesn't matter how we choose to describe the function of the frog's 
detector-mechanism because, metaphysically speaking, all that mattered to that 
selection was the neutrally described capacity to detect small, moving black 
dots.16 This is consistent with the fact that what was detected were often enough 
flies and these alone provided the ancestor frogs with (enough) nutrition to get by.
[29] There is something right and wrong in both these responses. On the one 
hand, Fodor is right in thinking that, when giving our selectionist explanations, 
how we choose to describe what-it-was that the ancestor frogs were meant to 
detect couldn't have mattered, metaphysically speaking. The only thing that could 
have made a difference to the selection of such detection devices was that they 
enabled frogs equipped with them to respond well enough to proliferate. On the 
other hand, Millikan is certainly right to think that it is the getting of nutrition which 
is responsible for proliferation of the frogs (and their detection devices) and hence 
describing their detection devices as fly-detectors has explanatory priority. For 
this reason Fodor's outright rejection of teleology gets the order of explanation 
wrong. Without a top-down, teleological account we would not fully understand 
why the mechanisms were selected at all. In this light, Neander's comments about 
what Darwin's interests are apposite in response to Fodor's remarks. She writes: 
[Darwin] might wonder which feature of the A/B situation was 
beneficial to the organism, and why it was beneficial, and he might 
wonder how the organism detects that it is an A/B situation, and 
which feature of such situations the organism is responding to. And 
the answers to these questions are not description insensitive. 
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Perhaps A was the benefit and B was the stimulus, or perhaps B was 
the benefit and A was the stimulus, or perhaps A was both the 
benefit and the stimulus, or perhaps B was. (Neander 1995: 122) 
[30] Having said this, looking from the bottom up, Millikan's account has appeared 
explanatorily insufficient to some. Her critics suggest that if we concentrate wholly 
on what actually benefits (or benefited) organisms as the basis for determining 
what an icon ought to "represent" then we are in danger of counter-intuitively 
demanding too much of these devices (Neander 1995: 126-129; Jacob 1997: 123-
124). Although a biosemantist herself, Neander makes this objection to Millikan. 
She illustrates the problem with appeal to the example of a male hoverfly. 
According to an exclusively benefit-based account a male hoverfly "misrepresents 
if he chases an infertile female or one who is soon to be the dinner of some 
passing bat" (Neander 1997: 127). Likewise the frog "misrepresents" if the fly it 
detects happens to be carrying a frog-killing virus or if it isn't in fact nutritious. For 
this reason it might be thought that on a benefit-based account the correct 
description of proper function of such devices is to lead hoverflies to "fertile 
mates" or enable frogs to get "nutritious protein". But putting things like this raises 
questions about the perceptual abilities of such organisms. For example, Jacob 
questions whether we can seriously credit organisms with the capacity to detect 
that which is "good for them" (Jacob 1997: 123). 
[31] This worry inspires Neander's proposal that when offering a biosemantic 
account we ought to look, as biologists do, at the "lowest level at which the trait in 
question is an unanalysed component of the [proper] functional 
analysis" (Neander 1995: 129). In saying this she reminds us that "what counts as 
"lowest" is relative to the trait in question" (Neander 1995: 129). This last point is 
graphically illustrated by figure 1 (modified from a version in Neander 1995: 125).
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[32] Considering this diagram we might wonder: Which level and its associated 
proper function matters to intentional content? Neander's answer is that we 
should look to the lowest level on the grounds that this reflects sound biological 
practice. She writes that "with respect to a given part (P) of an organism, 
biologists should (and do) give priority to that level of description which is most 
specific to P - the lowest level of description in the functional analysis before we 
go sub-P" (Neander 1995: 128). 
[33] But this move is ill motivated. For it is wholly consistent with Millikan's benefit-
based account of the direct proper function of intentional icons that there exist 
logically stacked proper functions of the kind Neander describes. What her 
diagram reveals is simply how various higher level ends are served by the 
successful performance of the lower level devices or mechanisms. Against this 
background we can see why Millikan's distinction between a device's direct proper 
function and its derived, adapted proper function is so important. Recall, in the 
case of the bees, that the ultimate source of the bee dance's derived proper 
function to direct the consumer to a particular location. This specific function is 
inherited from its direct proper function to get the consumer bee to nectar. For this 
reason Millikan assigns predominance to a device's direct proper function when 
determining the content of an icon. Looking at matters in this light reveals that 
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there is no need to make a choice between high and low biosemantics.
[34] If we accept that these levels are complementary then surely it is the case 
that the correct selectionist explanation of a hoverfly's target is "female hoverfly" 
while the frog's target is "fly". This can be seen in light of the concerns about 
perceptual capacities. In the normal environment of their ancestors it was the 
(perhaps rare) detection of these kinds of things which accounts for the 
proliferation of these kinds of detection devices. It was these types of thing that 
they were detected when all was well. In the normal environment of their 
ancestors detecting these kinds of thing was good enough. Hence, it is these 
types of thing that ought to be detected. And ought implies can. In my view, the 
Neander-Jacob objection is confused because the notion of a capacity is 
equivocal. In this case it would be wrong to define it comparatively. Of course it is 
true that given the nature of their sense organs frogs have a greater capacity to 
detect "small moving black dots" than they have to detect "flies". But this would 
only be a worry if we were defining the biosemantic normativity in statistical terms 
-- which we are not. In the right conditions they have the capacity to detect flies.
[35] Second, although Neander can rightly deploy the terminology of proper 
functions with respect to a device's lowest level of operation there are serious 
problems in taking this low road when it comes to understanding content. This is 
so even though it is true that such devices can malfunction in a way that demands 
a normative understanding.17 For example, Neander points out that: 
A sick frog might R-token at a snail if it was dysfunctional in the right 
way. Damaging the frog's neurology, interfering in its embryological 
development, tinkering with its genes, giving it a virus, all of these 
could introduce malfunction and error. Therefore, the theory I am 
defending does not reduce content to the non-normative notion of 
indication or natural meaning. (Neander 1995: 131; see Jacob 1997: 
118, 134) 
[36] It is with this observation in mind that Neander proposes a kind of 
"philosophical marriage of Fodor and Millikan". Such a union is supposed to 
provide a biologically plausible means of determining content (Neander 1995: 
137). But the price of this manoeuvre is to sacrifice an account of content 
altogether. This is clear if we consider the fact that Neander's account re-
introduces the problem of distality which Millikan's version of biosemantics laid to 
rest. Neander notes this herself by telling us that low church biosemantics "seems 
to drive us to proximal content...[for example,] it is, after all, by responding to a 
retinal pattern of a particular kind that the frog responds to small dark moving 
things" (Neander 1995: 136).18 This is not a trivial point; low church biosemantics 
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violates one of the minimal conditions for a device to count as an intentional icon. 
Unless we have independent reason to think that a device has the proper function 
of directing the organism towards some external state of affairs, we have no 
grounds for thinking it "represents". The mere fact that a device can malfunction is 
not sufficient to regard it as having representational capacities.
5. The virtues of modesty
[37] Having now defended Millikan's version of biosemantics from some recent 
criticisms I want to encourage adoption of it in a modest form. Ambitious 
biosemantics accounts suffer because they attempt to unpack the notion of basic 
representation in terms of truth-evaluable content (see Godfrey-Smith, 1994b). 
But I am unhappy with Millikan's claim that biosemantic theory provides a "non-
vacuous" ground for a correspondence theory of truth (see Millikan 1993: 86-94). 
Nor is she alone in advocating this use.19 Consider these remarks of Papineau 
and McGinn. 
The biological function of any given type of belief is to be present 
when a certain condition obtains: that then is the belief's truth 
condition (Papineau 1987: 64).20
[T]eleology turns into truth conditions...[because a] sensory state 
fulfils its function of indicating Fs by representing the world as 
containing Fs; and it fails in discharging that function when what it 
represents is not how things environmentally are (McGinn 1989: 148, 
151).21 
[38] By such lights all "representations", whatever other features they exhibit, or 
fail to exhibit, have truth-conditional content. While consideration of the scope of 
this claim may give us pause, the biosemantist re-assures us that only humans 
really have beliefs with propositional content; lesser creatures have less 
sophisticated representations (i.e. proto-beliefs, sub-doxastic states, etc.). Even 
so these crude representations are still true or false. Thus Millikan's examples of 
simple organisms are specifically meant to "make it clear how very local and 
minimal may be the mirroring of the environment is accomplished by an 
intentional icon" (Millikan 1993: 106). The thought is that such content enters into 
our natural history at a very early phase and becomes tied up with more and more 
complex cognitive dynamics as we travel up the phylogenetic tree. It is because 
we can describe systems of representation of graded complexity that we can 
explain the emergence of propositional content as a late development. For 
instance, we can mark the differences between creatures which are hard-wired for 
a particular environment and those which display plasticity (i.e. the ability to learn 
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to cope with new environments). This point is crucial to note lest we be led astray 
by talk of bees and frogs into thinking that there are no differences between their 
form of representation and ours.
[39] Millikan lists six fundamental differences between human and animal 
representations which "secure our superiority, [and] make us feel comfortably 
more endowed with mind" (Millikan 1989a: 297).22 The two most important on her 
list are the fact that we are able to make logical inferences by means of 
propositional content. Thus, only representations of the kind which respect the 
law of non-contradiction can be deemed to have propositional content (Millikan 
1989a: 296-297). In a nutshell, she holds that there are distinct types and levels 
of "representation" and that not all "representations" have the kind of content 
appropriate to full-fledged beliefs or desires. What this means is that 
biosemantists need not, and should not, hold that content of the frog's intentional 
icon is captured by the conceptual content of the English sentence "There is an 
edible bug" or any other near equivalent. Millikan is explicit about this. With 
reference to bees she writes: 
bee dances, though (as I will argue) these are intentional items, do 
not contain denotative elements, because interpreter bees 
(presumably) do not identify the referents of these devices but 
merely react to them appropriately. (Millikan 1984: 71). 
[40] What I take from this remark is that we "identify" the object that the bee is 
directed at as "nectar" using our own conceptual scheme. Indeed, we settle on 
this description because it is explanatorily relevant when giving a full, selectionist 
explanation of the proper function of bee dances. This much is incontestable. 
Moreover, due consideration of this fact reveals that although Fodor's critique 
concerning the indeterminacy of fixing intensional descriptions with respect to our 
selectionist explanations fails to undermine the biosemanticist project in the way 
he proposes, it is apposite to the extent that it highlights the fact that such 
descriptions are intensional in a way that the content of intentional icons is not. A 
better way to explicate the kind of content appropriate to such icons is to follow 
Rowlands and lean on Gibson's notion of affordances. Affordances are defined as 
"relational properties of things; they have be specified relative to the creature in 
question" (Rowlands 1997: 287). In this regard, Rowlands writes: "Thus, the 
surface of a lake affords neither support nor easy locomotion for a horse, but it 
offers both of these things for a water bug. To speak of an affordance is to speak 
elliptically; an affordance exists only in relation to particular organisms" (Rowlands 
1997: 287). Armed with this notion he suggests that the organism must be able to 
detect the affordances of its environment (as they relate to it) but not necessarily 
the objects of the environment per se (as we might describe them from our 
perspective). From this angle the "organismic proper function of the mechanism is 
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to enable the rattlesnake to detect a certain affordance of the environment, 
namely eatability. This allows the attribution of content such as 'eatability!' or 
'eatability, there!' to the rattlesnake" (Rowlands 1997: 291). The fact that we 
describe the proper function of the snake's detection device as one of locating 
"mice", and can do so on principled explanatory grounds, is incidental (see 
Rowlands 1997: 291). I am extremely sympathetic to the spirit of this proposal. 
Nevertheless we must be wary of treating it as a suggestion that we ought to 
positively designate the content of the snake's icon in terms of a concept such as 
"eatability". 
[41] This fits with the fact that in order to make a serious ascription of 
propositional content, the subject in question must manifest "finely discriminating" 
behaviour over a considerable period of time. As Davidson observes, for the most 
part, only a person's speech acts constitute such behaviour.23 In daily life what 
makes the ascription of propositional content to linguistic utterances expedient is 
the defeasible assumption that others speak our language. We can ask questions 
such as, "Do you mean this (e.g. some proposition) by that (e.g. some other 
proposition)". It is only if a speaker actively makes such choices, by accepting 
some propositions as adequate descriptions of their words, while rejecting others, 
that interpreters are able to ascribe propositional contents. Philosophical 
speaking, to discover what someone believes or "means" we must effectively put 
their utterances through an "intensionality test". The intensionality test essentially 
reveals in what way, and to what degree, a subject's words or thought is resistant 
to co-referential substitution.
[42] Imagine that Farah believes her homework is due on the 21st of March, but 
has only limited knowledge about the other ways in which that day might be 
correctly denoted. Although it is acceptable to her that we describe her thought 
about "the day the homework is due" by replacing it with propositions (2) and (3) 
below, she stoutly objects if we attempt to substitute it with proposition (1).24 
(1) "The homework is due on the first day of spring"
(2) "The homework is due on the 21st of March"
(3) "The homework is due tomorrow" 
[43] By considering this simple application of the "intensionality test", we learn 
several things. Firstly, in discovering what a person means by his or her 
utterances we are effectively locating the propositional content of such utterances 
in relation to other propositional contents. The content of any sentence or 
proposition is determined, at least in part, by its place in the "logical geography" of 
other contents.25 Notice that the way in which Farah conceives of "The day the 
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homework is due" is constrained in part by her other thoughts about that day. 
Farah's belief about "when the homework is due" could be refined if she 
discovered that there is a connection between "the first day of spring" and "the 
21st of March". This is related to the fact that a subject who is aware of this 
connection, ex hypothesi, has a conception of that day which is different and 
richer than Farah's.
[44] Also, by noting the pattern of inter-connections between propositional 
contents we can decide when someone is expressing a proposition which is the 
same, or similar, to our own. For instance, if my expression of the proposition 
"Scotland is beautiful" is to carry the same or similar meaning to yours, then we 
had better agree on quite a few other important propositions; such as "Scotland is 
North of England", "Slugs are not beautiful", "North is not East", "Scotland is a 
country", etc. (see Davidson 1984a: 257; Evnine 1991: 120-121). As Davidson 
frequently reminds us, there need be no definite set of beliefs (and attendant 
propositional contents) upon which we must agree in order to make such similarity 
claims. If such comparisons are to be plausible there need only be a reasonable 
degree of agreement (Davidson 1985c: 475). The point is that in order for there to 
be propositional contents there must be detailed patterns to speech and 
thought.26 In contrast, intentional icons do not have any propositional content as 
such, they are simply responses directed at creature-relative "affordances" (rather 
than objects per se). Thus, Rowlands is right to suggest that: 
One can, therefore, speak of the mechanism detecting flies, or 
enabling the frog to detect flies, but this is only in a secondary and 
derivative sense, and reflects neither the algorithmic nor the 
organismic proper function of the mechanism (Rowlands 1997: 295) 
[45] Any attempt to characterise the content of such icons in conceptual terms is 
an inappropriate attempt to deploy our own standard scheme of reference. But if 
one is willing to concede this then it is difficult to see what could motivate thinking 
of basic representations as having truth conditions. If such icon's lack intensional 
content then it is surely misguided to think of their mappings to the world in such 
terms. If icons are not proposition, and given that sense determines reference, we 
might ask: What is true? How can we have a truth relation if one of the crucial 
relata is absent. Hence, even if a modest version of biosemantics gives us a 
handle on the bivalent content of intentional icons it is a mistake to think of such 
content in truth-conditional terms. For these reasons I am critical of the idea that 
the biological norms which underwrite the simplest "representations", i.e. 
intentional icons, could be straightforwardly deployed in "flatfooted 
correspondence views of representation and truth" (Millikan 1993: 12).27 Contra 
Millikan, I maintain that although intentional icons are normatively directed at 
features of the world their "correctness conditions" are not best understood as 
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truth conditions. Biosemanticists should not assume that natural selection 
grounds truth, even though the mappings that emerge at this level may ultimately 
play a crucial role in understanding its nature.
6. The emergence of objectivity
[46] Moreover, when we consider how nonconceptual content might help in 
explaining the emergence of truth and objectivity it becomes clear that it is not just 
the holistic complexity of propositional thought that ties it to linguistic practice. If it 
were only an issue of such complexity then one might simply agree with 
Lockwood that "acquiring a language or concepts may be more akin to 
progressively finer tuning of an instrument with a vast number of strings than it is 
to learning a set of rules" (Lockwood 1989: 122). This analogy is misleading 
because the divide is much deeper. Developing a conceptual perspective on 
things is not a mere linear refinement of a single skill. Minimally, to speak of truth 
requires that the subject in question has a capacity for propositional judgement. 
As Dummett notes "In order to say anything illuminating about the concept of 
truth, then, we must link it with that of judgement or assertion" (Dummett 1993: 
157). Furthermore, understanding the conditions which make judgements, and 
the assessment of truth, possible is a complicated business. Hence, Dummett is 
also right to make the further claim that "A philosophical account of judgements 
lies, however, in their having a further significance than merely being right or 
wrong: they build up our picture of the world" (Dummett 1993: 157). In the follow 
up to this remark he has this to say: 
A philosophical account of the making of judgements which 
displayed it as no more than a skill, like playing darts, to be acquired 
and improved, would for that reason be utterly inadequate: a 
judgement has an enduring importance lacked by the throw of a dart. 
A judgement is the formation of a belief or the acquisition of a piece 
of knowledge: and this is manifested by our acting on what we know 
or believe.
The same is apparent in our mastery of language. A child in the 
earliest stages of acquiring language is trained to say certain things 
-- "Doggie", for instance, or, somewhat later "Doggie is asleep" -- in 
certain recognisable circumstances: and the adults are not, at that 
stage, much interested in whether his remarks have point or 
relevance, but only in whether he makes them in the right 
circumstances, those that warrant them. But if his ability to do this 
exhausted his linguistic competence, he could not yet be properly 
said to say that anything was so, such as that a dog was there or 
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that the dog was asleep, any more than a dog that has been trained 
to bark in a particular way when seeing his master approaching the 
house can be said to be saying his master is approaching. Both the 
child and the dog serve as extensions of others' sensory apparatus; 
but neither can be conceived as making assertions until the relation 
becomes reciprocal, so that they also become capable of acting on 
the statements of others. (Dummett 1993: 157-158, first emphasis 
original, second emphasis mine) 
[47] Dummett is here endorsing the Davidsonian stipulation that we should not 
ascribe propositional attitudes to any creature which lacks "a concept of belief". 
Having this concept is equivalent to being able to reciprocate in the way 
described above. And it is this capacity which is needed to generate a notion of 
an objective world. As Davidson claims the subject/object split only emerges 
when we have access to an inter-subjective standard; a social world.28 On this 
account our grasp of objectivity requires a kind of triangulation with another being 
who responds to things in a largely similar way to ourselves. The importance of 
the need for a "similarity of response" to "similar objects or features of the world" 
is revealed if we follow Davidson's cue and consider a "primitive learning 
situation" (Davidson 1992: 262). For example, he notes: 
the child learning the word "table", has already in effect noted the 
teacher's responses (mouthing "table") are similar (rewarding) when 
its own responses (mouthing "table") are similar. The teacher on his 
own part is training the child to make similar responses to what he 
(the teacher) perceives as similar stimuli. For this to work, it is clear 
that the innate responses of child and teacher -- what they naturally 
group together -- must be much alike. (Davidson 1992: 264) 
[48] If the child and the teacher did not respond to similar stimuli in similar ways 
then the child would be both unteachable and uninterpretable. We would have no 
grounds for saying that it was responding to "table-like" stimuli as opposed to 
"nerve-ending" stimuli, or some such. If triangulation is to be possible then we 
must assume that the child is capable of responding, attending and jointly-
attending to a common stimulus in the same way that the teacher responds. But 
the sharing of these capacities demands does not amount to the sharing of even 
basic conceptual categories. A modest biosemantic theory of non-conceptual 
content reveals such an assumption to be warranted on the grounds that 
creatures of the same species have been calibrated by natural selection to 
respond to particular features of their environment. The fact that two creatures are 
of the same species underwites that fact that they will likely respond to these 
features in largely similar ways. Although Davidson does not, and would not wish 
to, offer an account of non-conceptual content in order to explain the 
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psychological basis of our similar responses, he tells us, nonetheless, in a 
discussion of operant learning, that "If some...discriminative mechanisms were 
not built in, none could be learned" (Davidson 1992: 262; see also Povienelli 
1996: 297-299). Moreover, he remarks "it is we, because of the way we are 
constructed (evolution has something to do with this), that find these responses 
natural and easy to class together" (Davidson 1991b: 200).
[49] This brings us to another feature of his account of triangulation. In his view to 
form a belief for oneself requires that we are able to recognise that the responses 
of others are similar to our own. It is only by locating features of the world 
between two interpreting creatures that the minimal condition on the formation of 
beliefs about an objective world is met. Thus Davidson claims that there are, in 
fact, "three similarity patterns. The child finds tables similar, we find tables similar, 
and we find the child's responses in the presence of tables similar...Given these 
three patterns of response we can assign a location to the stimuli that elicit the 
child's responses" (Davidson 1992: 263). This account of triangulation is 
graphically illustrated by figure 2 below:29 
 
[50] On this account, truth and a conceptual understanding of an objective world 
emerge in the process of learning from and interpreting others.30 As Dummett 
notes it is only when the child can reciprocate and note the similarity between its 
response and that of its teachers that it begins to have a concept of belief and, 
hence, it meets the minimal condition for being a believer and judge itself. This is 
illustrated by the change of the arrow's direction in figure 3. 
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[51] It follows that concept of an objective world is, in some sense, generated if, 
and only if, communicators establish public criteria for the assessment of reports 
made by others. Noting this is vital for it highlights the fact that only creatures 
aware of such a "subjective-objective contrast" can be plausibly counted as 
assenting or dissenting to a proposition or sentence. In other words, a subject can 
only be counted as a thinker/believer if it is counted as having a conceptual point 
of view, or perspective, on what there is. The strong claim being made here is that 
without the capacity for triangulation there is no way to form such a perspective.31
[52] However, there have been objections to the idea that social triangulation is 
necessary for sponsoring a conceptual perspective. For example, Child claims 
that "on the face of it, the idea that what counts as similar to what is partially 
defined by similarity responses could be applied using only the similarity 
responses of an individual" (Child 1994: 21). A first reply might be this: In order to 
form a "concept of belief" and its attendant notions of truth, falsity and objectivity, 
one needs to take the role of observer and interpreter. One needs to recognise 
the existence of other perspectives in the world, and in doing so, one must be in a 
position to simultaneously compare these with one's own with respect to some 
common focal point. But, argues Child, this condition of mutual comparison alone 
does not rule out the possibility of an individual triangulating with itself 
diachronically by "reflecting on" its own responses (Child 1994: 22). This kind of 
reflection appears to be a logical possibility for explaining the emergence of an 
"objective world" without bringing in an explicitly "social" standard.32 This is 
illustrated by figure 4 below: 
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[53] There are at least two different ways to respond to this criticism. For example, 
it could be argued, on logical grounds, that Child's proposal is unworkable in that 
supposes that the subject is able to "re-identify" the same object over time and 
that this presupposes that the subject already has a grasp of the objective (see 
Hutto 1995b: 467-468). This response is particularly apposite if we accept the non-
conceptualist account. For, even if an agent is capable of responding to its 
environment in a sophisticated way this alone does not indicate that its responses 
are representative of "objective" features of that environment. This undercuts 
what is likely the strongest motivation for wishing to sponsor the solitary 
triangulation thesis: the thought that unless a creature was able to form an 
objective representation of the world we would be at a loss to explain the success 
of its complex actions in relation to it. But to assume such a basic capacity clearly 
begs the point in question. If we consider figure 4 we can see that such re-
identification (however it is achieved) is a requirement for proper triangulation.33 
Therefore, solitary triangulation may well be logically impossible.
[54] The second line of reply emphasises the fact that triangulation requires more 
than just a re-presentation of the "objects". It also requires that the subject 
recognises the similarity of response in the other. It is this second capacity which 
does most of the work in making "objective" thought possible. And, empirically 
speaking, in children it is a late development. For example, if we consider such 
experiments as the "false belief" task it seems clear that children do not have the 
resources to distinguish "alternative perspectives" at an early stage. Classically, in 
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the false belief task children are exposed to a situation in which a puppet, called 
Maxi, is shown a room in which a pile of biscuits is the main attraction. The 
puppet then leaves the stage and the children see the experimenter hide the 
biscuits in the cubbard. The children form the belief that "The biscuits are in the 
cubbard". However, it turns out that most three-year-olds have difficulty in 
ascribing a belief which differs from their own current belief to the Maxi-puppet 
when it re-enters the room. It has been plausibly suggested that they find it 
difficult to understand that the puppet can have perspective which differs from 
their own. The point is that if children had a built-in command of the conception of 
belief (and of a subject/object split) they would be better able to deal with false 
belief task. So what this tell us is that this ability is acquired, developed or kicks in, 
relatively late in the day. Whichever developmental story we wish to tell about this 
it is a plausible hypothesis that this capacity only emerge is provoked by the 
dynamics of actually attempting to relate to others. Moreover there is reason to 
believe that we simply do not recognise the existence of alternative perspectives 
accept through a process of engaging with, and interpreting others (see Smith 
1996: 353-354; Leslie and German 1995: 132). This may give us a reason to think 
that a capacity to recognise other perspectives is not simply provided by a time-
delayed innate module. Support for this stronger hypothesis comes from 
Ashington who writes: 
Parents talk to their children about feelings, thoughts, and desires 
from a very young age (Brown and Dunn 1991; Dunn 1988) and the 
extent to which they do this is related to the extent to which children 
talk about such states at a later point in time (Dunn, Brown and 
Beardsall 1991; Moore et al. 1994). Children are exposed to 
mentalistic talk in stories that are read to them and in their 
conversations about stories (Ashington 1990; Paley 1984). And they 
are often audience to narratives in adult conversations. (Ashington 
1996: 194) 
[55] This idea is further supported by consideration of recent work on the 
enculturation of the great apes, our nearest phylogenetic relatives. Enculturation 
takes many forms and even though it has not been systematically investigated at 
this point, researchers in the field are confident of its general effects on certain 
ape-individuals who have developed advanced capacities for communication and 
sign use due to their contact with human carers (see Tomasello and Call 1997: 
391; Call and Tomasello 1996). It is also well observed that apes do not develop 
these capacities in the wild or with conspecifics in captivity. In order to explain 
these limitations it is interesting that Tomasello and Call remark that: 
one hypothesis is that, although apes can master the "referential 
triangle" in their interactions with humans for instrumental purposes 
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when they are raised in humanlike cultural environments, they still do 
not attain humanlike social motivations for sharing experience with 
other intentional beings. (Tomasello and Call 1997: 393) 
This evidence from the study of apes makes it plausible to suppose that 
developing a capacity to recognise alternative perspectives only develops in a 
social context. All of this, I suggest, casts empirical doubt on the idea that an 
asocial creature would be in a position to triangulate with itself by reflecting on its 
earlier responses to stimulus.
[56] In closing it is useful to note two things. Firstly, accepting an account of non-
conceptual, intentional content is not at odds but rather nicely complements a 
Davidsonian account of radical interpretationalism. Secondly, this supplement 
lends support to the view that while sharing a common language (and conceptual 
responses) is a pragmatic feature of much content ascription, it is not a necessary 
constraint on the possibility of such ascription (Davidson 1984: ch. 18; 1986c).
7. Conclusion
[57] I conclude that there is nothing wrong in thinking that the most basic 
nonconceptual contents have "correctness conditions" provided we are careful in 
understanding their source and nature.34 We should not expect more of 
biosemantics than it can deliver. By eschewing truth conditions a biosemantic 
theory of content enables us to understand the kind of "correctness conditions" 
which apply to the lowest form of nonconceptual content. I am therefore explicitly 
following up Bermudéz's suggestion that such "Correctness conditions are fixed 
with reference to evolutionary design and past performance" (Bermúdez 1995: 
365, 366).35 This is in spirit of Cussins' general claim that "Natural selection has 
evolved creatures, by means of gradual and continuous changes, which are 
capable of a mind/world distinction..." (Cussins 1990: 409). 
[58] The view advanced is that animals can, and regularly do, produce very 
sophisticated, appropriate responses to their environments without employing 
"concepts". Acts of perception and responses to the world are not always 
(perhaps not even all that frequently) conceptual in character. But this does not 
mean that such intentional, nonconceptual responses are merely mechanical or 
dispositional. They have a normative dimension. Unlike Cussins I do think that 
"human practice shorn of external norms is mere physiology and 
physics" (Cussins 1992b: 653). But following Millikan I also believe that external 
norms do not derive from human practice in cases of basic intentionality. Thus, 
non-verbal organisms can make mistakes in a way that mere mechanisms 
cannot. They can respond in abnormal ways to their environment. For example, in 
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the case of the frog such "errors" are nothing like making the conceptual error of 
mistaking a black dot for a fly. Organisms with only nonconceptual content do not 
make errors of classification. 
[59] Evolutionary biology may, after all, offer an account of original intentionality 
but only if such intentionality is not thought of in terms of truth-valuational, 
conceptual content.36 Fodor is wrong to say "Darwin has nothing to say to 
Brentano" (Fodor 1990b: 79). If the most basic forms of intentionality must be 
understood in terms of non-conceptual content, then Darwin may have quite a lot 
to say. A modest biosemantics is perhaps the best way to understand the 
character of the most basic form of content which applies to nonconceptual 
responses.
Daniel Hutto
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Notes
1
 All we are told is that "acquiring a concept is getting nomologically locked to the 
property that the concept expresses" (Fodor 1998: 125). (back)
2
 I prosecute this project more fully in my forthcoming book The Presence of Mind 
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(Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins). (back)
3
 He also writes: "...there would be nothing fundamentally inimical to the general 
project of explaining conceptual content in terms of CT content... to recognize a 
distinction, within the class of objective representational contents..." (Peacocke 
1994: 425). (back)
4
 This is the line taken by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1995) in their famous attack on 
the attempt to use of connectionist architectures to describe cognitive level 
functions (cf. Fodor and Pylyshyn 1995: 116ff). (back)
5
 Elsewhere he writes: "mental states that represent the world but that do not 
require the bearer of those mental states to possess the concepts required to 
specify the way in which they represent the world" (Bermúdez 1994: 403, 
emphasis mine). He also says "Conceptual and nonconceptual content are both 
forms of content because there is a single notion of representation applicable to 
both" (Bermúdez 1995: 346). (back)
6
 As Rowlands writes "A modest version of the teleological account might see 
itself as restricted in scope to fairly basic representational mechanisms, probably 
innate, probably mechanisms of perceptual representation, and probably 
possessed by creatures whose representational capacities are fairly fixed and 
limited" (Rowlands 1997: 279). To a limited extent Jacob also promotes what he 
calls a "modest or minimalist" solution to the transitivity problem (cf. Jacob 1997: 
106). (back)
7
 This sits well with the idea that "natural selection does not care about truth; it 
cares about reproductive success" (Stich 1990: 62). (back)
8
 She quite rightly borrows the term "icon" from Peirce because it does not carry 
with it a legacy of confusion and disagreement. (back)
9
 Millikan was initially wont to speak of "producer and interpreter devices" in 
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, but given that she explicitly 
did not require that the interpreter "understand what the sign signs" (Millikan 
1984: 96), the term "consumer" is less misleading. With reference to the visual 
system of frogs', Rowlands has this to say: "mediating between the environmental 
presence of a fly and the motor response of the tongue strike is some sort of 
neural mechanism that registers the fly's presence in the vicinity and causes the 
strike of the frog's tongue" (Rowlands 1997: 283). (back)
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10
 She writes "The production and 'consumption' of the icon may be accomplished 
by any mechanisms designed, biologically or in some other way, to co-operate in 
the iconing project. For example, the dances that honey bees execute to guide 
fellow workers to nectar are paradigm cases of intentional icons" (Millikan 1993: 
107). (back)
11
 However, it is also vital to note, as Millikan does, that "The notions of 'function' 
and 'design' should not be read... as referring only to origin. Natural selection 
does not slack after the emergence of a structure but actually preserves it by 
acting against the emergence of less fit structures" (Millikan 1993: 86). (back)
12
 She says: "in the frog case, [the crucial initial relation is] that the firing of the 
detector is coincident with the presence of an edible bug" (Millikan 1993: 127). 
She has expressed the same view to me privately in the following terms: 
"Connecting with something black-and-a-dot is no part of any proximate normal 
explanation of why any particular ancestor's helped it survive. Neither the 
blackness nor the dotness helped in any way, neither need be mentioned. But the 
nutritious object was essential" (Millikan 1996: private correspondence). (back)
13
 She has repeatedly stressed that "the indeterminacy problem that Dretske and 
Fodor encountered is solved by examining the role of the representation 
consumer with care" (Millikan 1993: 126). (back)
14
 Thus, error "is determined by the stomach's function. Nutritious contents are 
contents that supply optimal conditions for the stomach's proper function of 
facilitating cell metabolism" (Millikan 1991: 156). (back)
15
 The idea is that "statements of biological functions are transparent or 
extensional, and this, allegedly, makes them ill-suited to capturing the 
intensionality of psychological ascriptions" (Rowlands 1997: 280). (back)
16
 Rowlands is right to say that "The problem of indeterminacy arises because 
there seems to be no fact of the matter that could determine which of these 
interpretations is the correct one. ...Evolutionary theory by itself, is neutral 
between the claim that the neural mechanism Normally mediates fly strikes, in 
which case strikes at BBs are errors, and the claim that the mechanism Normally 
mediates ambient black thing strikes that are situated in environments in which 
the little black things are Normally flies" (Rowlands 1997: 284). For similar 
reasons that Dennett writes that "there is no ultimate User's manual in which the 
real functions, and real meanings, of biological artifacts are officially represented...
[Thus] there is no...bedrock for what we might call original functionality" (Dennett 
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1987: 321). (back)
17
 Interestingly Godfrey-Smith also notes that "Although it is not always 
appreciated, the distinction between function and malfunction can be made within 
Cummins's framework....If a token of a component is not able to do whatever it is 
that other tokens do, that plays a distinguished role in the explanation of the 
capacities of the broader system, then that token is malfunctional" (Godfrey-Smith 
1993: 200). (back)
18
 To be fair Neander both recognises and hopes to address this problem at 
some stage. (back)
19
 Godfrey-Smith usefully outlines the full spectrum of views from the pessimistic 
to the optimistic in (Godfrey-Smith 1994b). (back)
20
 Papineau discusses the notion of truth more fully in his Philosophical 
Naturalism. Therein he tells us that he is attracted to a redundancy theory of truth 
which is backed up by a "substantial theory of content" (Papineau 1993: 85). 
Unsurprisingly, he tells us that "The substantial theory of content I favour is in 
terms of success conditions and biological purposes" (Papineau 1993: 85). (back)
21
 This view is endorsed in this passage from David Israel as quoted by Fodor; "...
if the world is as represented, [this] will constitute the performance of an action 
that satisfies the agent's desires. If the world is not the way it is represented as 
being, the bodily movement is considerably less likely to succeed" (Fodor 1990b: 
71, emphasis mine). (back)
22
 It is in this regard that Millikan responds to the rhetorical question "Is it really 
plausible that bacteria and paramecia, or even birds and bees, have inner 
representations in the same sense that we do? Am I really prepared to say that 
these creatures, too, have mental states, that they think? I am not prepared to say 
that" (Millikan 1989a: 294). Dretske makes a similar point when he writes: "[t]o 
qualify as a belief a representational content must also exhibit (amongst other 
things) the familiar opacity characteristic of the propositional attitudes..." (Dretske 
1986: 27, emphasis mine). (back)
23
 It is because "dumb animals" do not manifest such behaviour that we do not 
treat them or other non-verbals as thinkers even though we sometimes describe 
them in a doxastic-idiom (Davidson 1985: 477). Davidson makes this perfectly 
clear by saying, "If we use words like "believe", "think", "intend" while dropping the 
feature of semantic opacity, we are not using those words to attribute 
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propositional attitudes" (Davidson 1985: 475). He remarks that "it is clear that a 
very complex pattern of behaviour must be observed to justify the attribution of a 
single thought...I think there is such a pattern only if the agent has 
language" (Davidson 1985: 476). Or Quine's words, "Conceptualization on any 
considerable scale is inseparable from language" (Quine 1960: 3). This analysis 
fits with Wittgenstein's remark: "A dog believes his master is at the door. But can 
he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow? ....Can only those 
who talk hope? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to 
say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of 
life" (Wittgenstein 1953: § II, 174e; see also 1953: § 132). It is obvious that the 
dog can have immediate evidence of his master's presence at the door (e.g. his 
scent) and it is correct to say that in some sense he is directed at his master's 
homecoming. But if we wanted to say of the dog that it believed that "my master 
will return the day after tomorrow", then it is clear we would be attributing it with 
more mental capacity than a mere ability to respond intentionally to a situation. In 
other words, it needs to a more sophisticated means of expressing itself than 
scratching at the door to express that thought. (back)
24
 By considering this case, we can see why prompted assent, of some form or 
another, is the vital and minimal evidence in the project of linguistic interpretation. 
(back)
25
 Davidson expresses this view by saying, "The meaning (interpretation) of a 
sentence is given by assigning the sentence a semantic location in the pattern of 
sentences that comprise the language" (Davidson 1984: 138-139, 225, Ramberg 
1989: 62). (back)
26
 That is why it is crucial to remember that "only by studying the pattern of 
assents to sentences can we decide what is meant and what is 
believed" (Davidson 1984: xvii, cf. also Ramberg 1989: 60). (back)
27
 Millikan tells us that it is "specifiable correspondence rules that give the 
semantics for the relevant system of representation...[and that a] certain 
correspondence between the representation and the world is what is 
normal" (Millikan 1989a: 287). She also boldly says "I take myself to be defending 
the strongest possible kind of correspondence theory of truth and the most flat-
footed interpretation of the truth-conditions approach to semantics" (Millikan 1993: 
212). (back)
28
 Davidson tells us, "Communication depends, then, on each communicant 
having, and correctly thinking the other has, the concept of a shared world. But 
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the concept of an inter-subjective world is the concept of an objective world, a 
world about which the communicant can have beliefs" (Davidson 1985: 480). He 
also says, "We have the idea of belief only from the role of belief in the 
interpretation of language, for as a private attitude it is not intelligible except as an 
adjustment to the public norm provided by language" (Davidson 1984: 170). 
O'Hear points out when describing Wittgenstein's views on a similar matter, 
"learning and teaching obviously presupposes a community in which a particular 
picture of the world and concomitant standards of rationality are transmitted to the 
learner" (O'Hear 1991: 55, cf. also 53). It is for this reason that, when it comes to 
understanding meaning of propositional or de dicto thoughts, "what is to be 
explained is a social phenomenon...[and that]...language is intrinsically 
social" (Davidson 1990: 314). (back)
29
 Davidson describes such a picture when he writes: "one line goes from the 
child in the direction of the table, one line goes from us in the direction of the 
table, and the third line goes from us to the child. Where the lines from the child to 
the table and us to the table converge 'the' stimulus is located. Given our view of 
the child and world, we can pick out 'the' cause of the child's 
responses" (Davidson 1992: 263). (back)
30
 Since the notions of objective truth and error arise only in the context of 
interpretation and against the background of an inter-subjective norm we can 
expect the concepts of subject and object to emerge, as it were, simultaneously. 
We might make use of Heidegger's term and say they are equiprimordial 
(Heidegger 1962 § 43, § 200). Davidson's way of expressing this is to say, "the 
foundations of knowledge must be subjective and objective at once" (Davidson 
1986b: 327). I take this to be what he means in saying, "the world is disclosed 
essentially along with the Being of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962: § 43, § 203). Or as 
Gadamer puts it, "The agreement about things that takes place in language 
means neither a priority of things nor a priority of the human mind" (Gadamer 
1976a: 78). This in turn helps us to make sense of the remark that "we are always 
already at home in language, just as much as we are in the world" (Gadamer 
1976b: 63). In Taylor's words: "[the] 'transcendental' condition of our having a 
grasp on our own language [is] that we in some fashion confront it or relate it to 
the language of others...the very confidence that we know what we mean, and 
hence our having our own original language depends on this relating...We are 
induced into language by being brought to see things as our tutors do" (Taylor 
1989: 38). (back)
31
 Despite the early concerns about non-verbals failing the intensionality test, this 
is primarily why Davidson demands that to be a believer of truths requires "the gift 
of tongues" (Davidson 1985: 473). (back)
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32
 If this correct, then as Child notes "it is not clear we have been given an 
adequate reason to think that only communication with others could provide [the] 
resources [for a subjective-objective contrast]" (cf. Child 1994: 22). (back)
33
 The diagram is designed to show that the problem is not about possible 
memory failure. For "remembering" the stimulus is not the issue -- but 
remembering it as "the same" as before is. (back)
34
 This sits well with the idea that "natural selection does not care about truth; it 
cares about reproductive success" (Stich 1990: 62). (back)
35
 He also maintains that: "subpersonal information states lend themselves to a 
teleological theory of content" (Bermúdez 1995: 365, 366). Although this may be 
correct, as Cussins noted, nonconceptual content need not apply only to sub-
personal states and systems ("Nonconceptual Content Conference", University of 
Hertfordshire, 1st November 1997). (back)
36
 Someone like Dennett might object to such talk on the grounds that all 
intentionality must be derived. However, as Hornsby says, "Of course our 
intentionality might be supposed to 'derive' from our genes in some bland sense, 
not requiring that genes should be carrying out their own purposes" (Hornsby 
1992: 169-170). She rightly notes that this "derivation" is nothing like the derived 
intentionality enjoyed by human artifacts (i.e. robots, etc.). Thus, when Dennett 
proposes arguments to the contrary he is, in effect, "playing fast and loose with 
the notion of derivation" (Hornsby 1992: 170). (back)
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